484b4c7190
All 3 vault voters now on proxmox-lvm-encrypted (vault-0 16:18, vault-1 + vault-2 today). The NFS fsync incompatibility identified in the 2026-04-22 raft-leader-deadlock post-mortem is no longer reachable — raft consensus log + audit log live on LUKS2 block storage with real fsync semantics. Cluster-wide consumers of the inline kubernetes_storage_class.nfs_proxmox dropped to zero after the rolling, so the resource is removed from infra/stacks/vault/main.tf. Released NFS PVs (6) remain in the cluster and will be reclaimed in Phase 3 cleanup. Lesson learned (recorded in plan): pvc-protection finalizer races the StatefulSet controller — pod recreates on the OLD PVCs unless the finalizer is patched out before pod delete. Force-finalize technique applied to vault-1 + vault-2 successfully. Closes: code-gy7h
148 lines
7 KiB
Markdown
148 lines
7 KiB
Markdown
# NFS-Hostile Workload Migration — Plan
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**Date**: 2026-04-25
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**Design**: `2026-04-25-nfs-hostile-migration-design.md`
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**Beads**: code-gy7h (Vault, epic), code-ahr7 (Immich PG)
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## Phase 1 — Immich PG (DONE 2026-04-25)
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| Step | Done |
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|---|---|
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| Snapshot extensions + row counts to `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-*` | ✓ |
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| Quiesce `immich-server` + `immich-machine-learning` + `immich-frame` | ✓ |
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| `pg_dumpall` → `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-<ts>.sql` (1.9 GB) | ✓ |
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| Add `kubernetes_persistent_volume_claim.immich_postgresql_encrypted` (10Gi, autoresize 20Gi cap) | ✓ |
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| Swap `claim_name` at `infra/stacks/immich/main.tf` deployment | ✓ |
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| Patch init container to gate on `PG_VERSION` (chicken-and-egg fix) | ✓ |
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| Force pod restart so override.conf gets written | ✓ |
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| Restore dump | ✓ |
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| `REINDEX clip_index`, `REINDEX face_index` | ✓ |
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| Scale apps back up | ✓ |
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| Verify: `\dx`, row counts (~111k assets), HTTP 200 internal/external | ✓ |
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| LV present on PVE host (`vm-9999-pvc-...`) | ✓ |
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### Phase 1 follow-ups (not blocking)
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- Old NFS PVC `immich-postgresql-data-host` retained 7 days for
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rollback. After 2026-05-02: remove `module.nfs_postgresql_host`
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from `infra/stacks/immich/main.tf` and the CronJob's reference.
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- Backup CronJob (`postgresql-backup`) still writes to the NFS
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module. After cleanup, point it at a dedicated backup PVC or to
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the existing `immich-backups` NFS share.
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## Phase 2 — Vault Raft (DONE 2026-04-25)
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**Phase 2 complete 2026-04-25; all 3 voters on `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`.**
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### Pre-flight (T-0) — DONE 2026-04-25 15:50 UTC
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- [x] Verify all 3 vault pods sealed=false, raft healthy.
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- [x] Take fresh `vault operator raft snapshot save` (anchor saved at
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`/tmp/vault-pre-migration-20260425-155029.snap`, 1.5 MB).
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- [ ] Optional: scale ESO to 0 — skipped (auto-unseal sidecar is
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independent; ESO refresh churn is non-disruptive for one swap).
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- [x] Confirmed leader is **vault-2** → migrate vault-0 first
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(non-leader), vault-1 next, vault-2 last (with step-down).
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Plan originally assumed vault-0 was leader; same intent
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(non-leader first).
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- [x] Thin pool headroom: 54.63% used, plenty for 6 × 2 GiB LVs.
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### Step 0 — Helm values + StatefulSet swap — DONE 2026-04-25 16:08 UTC
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- [x] Edit `infra/stacks/vault/main.tf`: change
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`dataStorage.storageClass` and `auditStorage.storageClass`
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from `nfs-proxmox` → `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`.
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- [x] `kubectl -n vault delete sts vault --cascade=orphan` (StatefulSet
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`volumeClaimTemplates` is immutable; orphan keeps pods+PVCs
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alive while we recreate the controller with the new template).
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- [x] `tg apply -target=helm_release.vault` → recreates STS with new
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VCT (full-stack `tg plan` blocks on unrelated for_each-with-
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apply-time-keys errors at lines 848/865/909/917; targeted
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apply on the helm release alone is the right scope here).
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Existing pods still on old NFS PVCs.
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### Step 1 — Roll vault-0 first (non-leader) — DONE 2026-04-25 16:18 UTC
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- [x] `kubectl -n vault delete pod vault-0 --grace-period=30`
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- [x] `kubectl -n vault delete pvc data-vault-0 audit-vault-0`
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- [x] STS controller recreated pod; new PVCs auto-provisioned on
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`proxmox-lvm-encrypted` (LVs `vm-9999-pvc-fb732fd7-...` data
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4.12%, `vm-9999-pvc-36451f42-...` audit 3.99%).
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- [x] **Hit and fixed**: vault-0 CrashLoopBackOff'd with
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`permission denied` on `/vault/data/vault.db`. The helm chart's
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`statefulSet.securityContext.pod` block in main.tf only set
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`fsGroupChangePolicy`, replacing (not merging) the chart's
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defaults `fsGroup=1000, runAsGroup=1000, runAsUser=100,
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runAsNonRoot=true`. NFS exports made the missing fsGroup a
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no-op; ext4 LV needs it to chown the volume root for the
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vault user. Old vault-1/vault-2 pods were created before that
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block was added so they still had the chart-default
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securityContext from their original spec. Fix: provide all
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five fields explicitly in main.tf and re-apply. Same root
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cause will affect vault-1 and vault-2 swaps unless this stays
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in place.
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- [x] Wait Ready; auto-unseal sidecar unsealed; `retry_join` rejoined
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raft cluster.
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- [x] Verify: `vault operator raft list-peers` shows 3 voters,
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vault-0 follower, leader=vault-2. External HTTPS 200.
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### Step 2 — 24h soak (SKIPPED per user direction 2026-04-25)
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User instructed "continue with all the remaining actions" — soak
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gates compressed to per-pod settle windows + raft-state verification
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between rollings. No Raft alarms, no Vault errors observed at each
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verification gate.
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### Step 3 — Roll vault-1 — DONE 2026-04-25
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- [x] Force-finalize PVCs to break re-mount race:
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`kubectl -n vault patch pvc data-vault-1 audit-vault-1 -p '{"metadata":{"finalizers":null}}' --type=merge`.
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(Initial pod-then-PVC delete recreated pod on the OLD NFS PVCs
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because pvc-protection finalizer hadn't cleared. Lesson learned
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and applied to vault-2 below.)
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- [x] Pod recreated on encrypted PVCs; auto-unsealed; rejoined raft.
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### Step 4 — Settle window — DONE 2026-04-25
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3-check verification over 90s; raft index advancing (2730010→2730012),
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all 3 voters healthy.
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### Step 5 — Roll vault-2 (leader) — DONE 2026-04-25
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- [x] `vault operator step-down` on vault-2; vault-0 took leadership.
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Confirmed vault-0 active, vault-1+vault-2 standby before delete.
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- [x] Snapshot anchor at `/tmp/vault-pre-vault2.snap` (1.5 MB) from new
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leader vault-0.
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- [x] Force-finalize + delete PVCs + delete pod (lesson from vault-1).
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- [x] Pod recreated on encrypted PVCs; auto-unsealed; rejoined raft.
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- [x] `vault operator raft list-peers` shows 3 voters all healthy on
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encrypted storage; leader vault-0.
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### Step 6 — Cleanup — DONE 2026-04-25
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- [x] `kubectl get pvc -A` cross-cluster shows zero PVCs on
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`nfs-proxmox` SC (only Released PVs remain → Phase 3).
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- [x] Removed inline `kubernetes_storage_class.nfs_proxmox` from
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`infra/stacks/vault/main.tf` (was lines 29–42).
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- [x] All 3 PVC pairs on `proxmox-lvm-encrypted`.
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- [x] `vault operator raft autopilot state` healthy=true.
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- [x] External `https://vault.viktorbarzin.me/v1/sys/health` = 200.
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## Phase 3 — Released-PV cleanup (FOLLOW-UP)
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After Phase 1+2 land cleanly, ~30 PVs in `Released` hold dead LVs.
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Reclaim by:
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1. List Released PVs, confirm LV exists on PVE.
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2. `kubectl delete pv <name>` (CSI removes underlying LV when PV is
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orphaned with `Retain` reclaim policy and no PVC reference).
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3. If LV survives: manual `lvremove pve/vm-9999-pvc-<uuid>`.
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## Rollback
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| Phase | Trigger | Action |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1 | Immich UI broken / data loss | Revert `claim_name`; restore from `/tmp/immich-pre-migration-*.sql` to old NFS PVC |
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| 2 (mid-rolling) | Single pod broken | Delete the encrypted PVC; recreate with NFS SC explicitly; cluster keeps quorum from 2 healthy pods |
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| 2 (post-rolling, raft corrupt) | Cluster-wide failure | `vault operator raft snapshot restore <pre-migration.snap>` |
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| Catastrophic | All Vault data lost | Restore from latest `/srv/nfs/vault-backup/` snapshot via CronJob output |
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